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NEGLIGENCE-JOINT ENTERPRISE BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE AS BASIS
FOR IMPUTATION OF NEGLIGENCE-H's car, driven by H with Was passenger,
collided with D's car as Hand W were traveling from their California home to
visit relatives in Florida. Both intended to seek employment in Florida and, if
successful, to take up residence there. Each had been employed since marriage,
their salaries going into a common fund. From this fund the car was purchased
and the trip financed. In suit by Wand H against D, held, recovery of W denied.
Because there was a joint enterprise between W and H, H's contributory negligence was imputed to W. Caliando v. Huck, (D.C. Fla. 1949) 84 F. Supp. 598.
An innocent plaintiff ·will not be denied recovery against a negligent defendant by the contributory negligence of a third person, in the absence of a special
relationship between the plaintiff and third person such as master and servant,
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principal and agent, or joint enterprise.1 Joint enterprise is most frequently used
as a defense in auto cases, when a negligent driver seeks to escape liability to an
injured passenger of another car by showing that this relationship existed between
the passenger and his driver. If the joint enterprise is established, the contributory
negligence of a plaintiff's driver will almost universally be imputed to the plaintiff, thus defeating recovery. 2 Though the legal consequences of the relationship
are clear, its definition is by no means settled.'3 Joint enterprise is generally considered, however, to be a relationsip between parties in which each has an interest
in the purposes of a venture and a right of control over other members in directing
that venture.4 The control element is considered most important,5 though of
significance as well are the potential liability of the plaintiff to the defendant for
conduct of the third party6 and common financial purpose.7 Tending to establish
the right of control are such factors as joint ownership or possession,8 sharing of
expenses,9 and, less important, evidence of alternative driving10 or directions as
to manner of driving.11 The fact of marital or blood ties between the parties has
frequently been held insufficient of itself to effect the necessary control.12 That
the courts do refuse to find a joint venture when, as an only basis, the plaintiff and
1 Koplitz v. City of St. Paul, 86 Minn. 373, 90 N.W. 794 (1902). See generally,
PROSSER, ToRTS, §§55, 65 (1941); 45 C.J., §§573, 574 (1928). But Thorogood v. Bryan,
8 C. B. 115, 137 Eng. Rep. 452 (1849), origin of the doctrine of imputed negligence, laid
down the early broad rule that the contributory negligence of a driver will always be imputed
to his passenger on a theory of "identification" of passenger with driver (at least in carrier
cases). The case and its theory is everywhere repudiated today. See particularly, Little v.
Hackett, 116 U.S. 366, 6 S.Ct. 391 (1886). Michigan, in 1946, was the last state to
repudiate the doctrine.
2 Weintraub, "The Joint Enterprise Doctrine in Automobile Law," 16 CoRN. L. Q.
320 (1931).
3 Rosenstrom v. North Bend Stage Line, 154 Wash. 57 at 60, 280 P. 932 (1929).
4 Cunningham v. City_ of Thief River Falls, 84 Minn. 21, 86 N.W. 763 (1901). The
theory of the relationship is said to be "quasi-partnership" in Robison v. Oregon-Wash. R.
& N. Co., 90 Ore. 490, 176 P. 594 (1919); or agency in Harber v. Graham, 105 N.J. 213,
143 A. 340 (1928).
5 Koplitz v. City of St. Paul, supra, note 1.
6 This is the so-called "two-way" test, often weighed as heavily as the control element;
2 TORTS RESTATEMENT, §485 (1934).
7 Robison v. Oregon-Wash. R. & N. Co., supra, note 4; Peterson v. Norris, 193 Minn.
400, 258 N.W. 729 (1935) (denying joint enterprise for lack of common financial purpose).
s Zajic v. Johnson, 126 Neb. 191, 253 N.W. 77. (1934). A possible distinguishing
feature in that case is that the parties are partners.
o Derrick v. Salt Lake and Ogden Ry. Co., 50 Utah 573, 168 P. 335 (1917).
10 Fisher v. Johnson, 238 lli. App. 25 (1925).
11 Ronan v. J. G. Turnbull Co., 99 Vt. 280, 131 A. 788 (1926).
12Brubaker v. Iowa County, 174 Wis. 574, 183 N.W. 690 (1921); 59 A.L.R. 153 at
154 (1929). Cases contra can generally be explained by reference to a community property
statute in the jurisdiction, as in Solko v. Jones, 117 Cal. App. 372, 3 P. (2d) 1028 (1931);
or an adherence to Thorogood v. Bryan, supra, note 1, as in the Michigan cases, which are
cited and overruled in Bricker v. Green, 313 Mich. 218, 21 N.W. (2d) 105 (1946). If the
wife may not sue in her own name, recovery will be precluded by her husband's contributory
negligence, for he will not be permitted to sue in her behalf.
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third party are husband and wife is justifiable. To hold otherwise would mean
that throughout their lives, innocent parties would have no redress against tortfeasors, because of what an oft-present third person had done. Indeed, this result
would obtain, though in fact no right of control existed. In the principal case
certain elements tending toward joint enterprise are found, such as a common
purpose ( which is not clearly financial, however) and shared expenses, but these
elements are common to a great percentage of marriages and marital activities.
Further, the wife does not participate in the ownership of the vehicle.13 To hold
loosely that these factors with marriage establish a joint venture is to force a similar
conclusion in the countless cases in which husband and wife ride together, and
to revive, by virtue of result, the Thorogood rule.14 Aware of these undesirable
consequences, another court in a case somewhat similar in its facts came to an
opposite conclusion. 15
Theodore Sachs

18 However, the statement of facts is ambiguous. Lucey v. Allen, 44 R.I. 379, 117 A.
539 (1922), held that the wife's sole ownership was a basis for concluding that she had the
right of control. Rollison maintains ownership by the wife is the only proper basis for that
conclusion: Rollison, ''The Joint Enterprise in the Law of Imputed Negligence," 6 NoTBB
DAME LAWYER 172 (1931). Perhaps implicit in the court's opinion is the feeling that
beyond mere form of title registration, real ownership should be attributed to the common
purchasers of an auto. Linking that premise with the view that ownership means control, the
court reaches the conclusion of the principal case. Since the facts otherwise present few
indices of joint enterprise, the decision must therefore rest upon this questionable premise.
14 Thorogood v. Bryan, supra, note 1. The court in the principal case relies ambiguously
on Union Bus Co v. Smith, 104 Fla. 569, 140 S. 631 (1932). Whether the Union case is
cited to show determination of joint venture, or its effects, if found, is not clear. In any event,
it is questionable whether the Union case denies its plaintiff recovery because of imputed
negligence or his own contributory negligence.
15 H and W, moving to another city, where H intended to teach and W to attend college, with a view to obtaining a position, were found not to be engaging in a joint venture.
Financial arrangements were not discussed in the opinion. "Husbands and wives in their
journey through life are always engaged in joint enterprises, sometimes successful, sometimes
disastrous. But the mere fact that they travel in the same car, whether for pleasure or to
change their abode, does not constitute a joint enterprise within the meaning of the rule."
Brubaker v. Iowa County, supra, note 12.

